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THE RIGHT TO VOTE OF THE MENTALLY
DISABLED IN OKLAHOMA: A CASE STUDY
IN OVERINCLUSIVE LANGUAGE AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS'
Poor Tom, that eats the swimming frogs, the toads, the tadpole, the wall
newt and the water newt, that in the fury of his heart, when the foul
fiend rages, eats cow dung, fox sallets, swallows the old rat and the ditch
dog, drinks the green mantle of the slimy pool; who is shipt from tything
to tything, and stocked, punished and imprisoned. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Through a history marked by segregation, exploitation, and at-
tempted extermination, 3 to a current status as a governmentally pro-
tected class,4 the mentally retarded have consistently been the subject of
societal misconception. The passage of time, coupled with a greater un-
derstanding of retardation and its effects, has served to temper this mis-
conception and eliminate much of the extreme treatment common in
1. The statutory topic of this comment, Title 26, Section 4-101(3), [hereinafter Section 4-
10 1(3)] will be purged from the Oklahoma Statutes effective November 1, 1989. See Act of May 8,
1989, ch. 174, 1989 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 438 (West) (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-101).
Though this revision virtually eliminates the voting rights restriction on the mentally retarded in
Oklahoma, its thirteen-year existence in the Oklahoma statutes serves to highlight one example of
the statutory provisions which unconstitutionally infringe upon the fundamental rights of a
population. (For other rights recognized by the United States Supreme Court as fundamentally
protected by the United States Constitution, see infra note 35.) The following analysis of former
Section 4-101(3) under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment serves to illustrate
the United States Supreme Court's approach to overinclusive statutory language in the context of
fundamental rights.
2. SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act 3, scene 4, quoted in S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MEN-
TALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 4 n.18 (1971).
3. Historically the mentally retarded have been subject to various methods of extermination,
ostracized and segregated from the community, and tolerated for their entertainment value. The
retarded were also often considered demonically possessed, and were tortured in an effort to exorcize
the demons. For a general discussion of the history of the mentally retarded, see B. GEARHEART &
F. LITrON, THE TRAINABLE RETARDED 1-19 (1975) [hereinafter GEARHEART & LITTON]; see also
S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 1 (1971); W. EHLERS, C.
KRISHEF & J. PROTHERO, AN INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL RETARDATION: A PROGRAMMED
TEXT 17-19 (1973) [hereinafter EHLERS, KRISHEF & PROTHERO].
4. Both nationally and in Oklahoma, legislation has been enacted to reflect a more contempo-
rary understanding of the nature and treatment of mental disability. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-
6083 (Supp. IV 1986); Group Homes for the Developmentally Disabled or Physically Handicapped
Persons Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 1-818.1-.41 (Supp. 1988) [hereinafter Group Homes Act];
Oklahoma Guardianship Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, §§ 1-101 to 5-101 (Supp. 1988).
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earlier times.5 Still, however, a stigma of inferiority persists in the minds
of a substantial percentage of the population.6 This stigma, as is often
true with respect to any superior-inferior dichotomy, has developed into
blind and overinclusive discrimination 7 based not on evaluation of the
individual, but rather on a stereotypical perception of the retarded as a
class.
For a period in excess of ten years, title 26, section 4-101(3)1 of the
Oklahoma Statutes (hereinafter Section 4-101(3)), by denying the right to
vote to the mentally retarded in Oklahoma,9 stood as one form of this
overinclusive discrimination.' 0 Though the statute reflected a more pro-
gressive terminology"' than that found in the original exclusions of the
Oklahoma Constitution, t2 it failed to reflect a concomitant appreciation
5. Earliest recorded history indicates that the retarded were often exterminated. One method
of accomplishing this task was to cast these individuals out to sea on "ships of fools." S. HERR, S.
ARONS & R. WALLACE, LEGAL RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 143 (1983). The retarded
were often tortured to exorcise the demons thought to possess them and were commonly kept as
playthings or court jesters. GEARHEART & LITTON, supra note 3, at 1-2; EHLERS, KRISHEF &
PROTHERO, supra note 3, at 17-19.
6. For a general discussion of public attitudes toward the mentally retarded, see M. BEGAn &
S. RICHARDSON, THE MENTALLY RETARDED: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 102-05 (1975)
[hereinafter BEGAB & RICHARDSON]; for a general discussion of attitude-changing strategies, see id.
at 159.
7. Many parallels can be drawn between the discriminations experienced by ethnic minorities,
women, and the mentally retarded. See S. HERR, S. ARONS & R. WALLACE, supra note 5, at 143.
8. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-101 (1981) stated:
Every person who is a qualified elector as defined by Section I of Article III of the
Oklahoma Constitution shall be entitled to become a registered voter in the precinct of his
residence, with the following exceptions:
3. "Mentally retarded persons" as defined by Section 3 of Title 43A of the Oklahoma
Statutes shall be ineligible to register.
Id.
9. Section 4-101(3) technically did not deny the right to vote. Rather, it rendered the retarded
ineligible to register to vote. In order to legally vote, a party must be registered. OKLA. STAT. tit.
26, § 4-102 (1981). However, because Section 4-101(3) denied the right to register, for purposes of
this Comment, it is considered effective to have denied the right to vote.
10. A similar analysis might also be appropriate with respect to OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-
101(2), regarding the adjudicated mentally incompetent. For text of Section 4-101(2), see infra note
21.
11. "Idiot," "lunatic," and all other analogous terms were deleted from Article III, Section I of
the Oklahoma Constitution in 1964. All restrictions on the right of suffrage, except for the age and
residency requirements contained in the Oklahoma Constitution, are provided in the Oklahoma stat-
utes. The statutory exclusion previously referred to "mentally retarded persons." More recently
enacted statutes refer to these individuals as "developmentally disabled." See infra note 28.
12. The Oklahoma Constitution, as adopted in 1907, included eligibility requirements for the
electorate of this state. Among these were the requirements that the electorate be male citizens of
both the United States and Oklahoma, twenty-one years of age and residents of the state for one
year, the county for six months, and the precinct for thirty days. In addition, the Oklahoma Consti-
tution excluded convicted felons, indigents, persons in public prisons, idiots and hnatics. OKLA.
CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907, repealed 1964). In 1964, the terms "idiot" and "lunatic" were replaced
2
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for progressive understanding of the retarded. Rather, by failing to rec-
ognize the complexity of retardation and the diversity of its effects, the
statute perpetuated a prevailing misconception regarding the retarded
and unconstitutionally abridged their fundamental right to vote.
Pointed advances in national policy, structured to protect the
franchise generally, 3 did little to prevent the 1979 enactment of Section
4-101(3). Though many states maintained cerebrally-focused restrictions
on the franchise during this period, because Oklahoma was the only state
to specifically exclude the retarded,' 4 little national attention focused on
the restriction. Consequently, it became unequivocally clear that in spite
of the paucity of case law on the subject, 5 any meaningful reevaluation
of the voting rights of the mentally retarded in Oklahoma would have to
originate within the state.'
6
Ongoing revisions in other areas of the Oklahoma statutes indicated
with: "who is a patient in an institution for mental retardation, or who has been committed, by
judicial order to an institution for mental illness." OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1964, repealed 1978).
13. Legislation has been implemented with the specific intention of increasing the power of the
Attorney General in prosecuting cases of discriminatory practices by state and local governments
(see, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 131, 71 Stat. 634 (1957); Civil Rights Act
of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, § 601, 74 Stat. 86, 90 (1960); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, § 101, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)) as well as preventing discriminatory voting practices altogether (see,
e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1982))). Additionally, the Supreme Court has offered protection of the
franchise in various contexts. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (property-rendering re-
quirements held invalid); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residence require-
ments held unconstitutional); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (federal-enclave residents
enfranchised); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll-tax held
unconstitutional).
14. Forty-five states exclude individuals from voting based on criteria related to mental capac-
ity. B. SALES, DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100-04 (1982). Many of the classifications cur-
rently in use throughout the United States suffer the same infirmities of ambiguity as the term
"mentally retarded persons" did in Section 4-101(3). Classifications most often used include: In-
sane persons - 17 states; Idiots and Mentally Incompetent persons - 13 states each; Persons under
guardianship - 9 states; Persons non compos mentis - 7 states; Incompetent institutional residents - 3
states; Persons of unsound mind - 3 states; Persons committed to an institution for the mentally ill or
insane - 2 states; Mentally Diseased persons - I state; Mentally Retarded persons - 1 state. Id. at
100.
15. Though unchallenged in the area of voting rights for the mentally disabled, Oklahoma has
been challenged in other areas restricting the franchise. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939) (voter registration provisions held racially discriminatory in violation of fifteenth amend-
ment); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (discriminatory effect of grandfather clause
exemption to literacy test found unconstitutional).
16. This reevaluation has in fact originated within the state. With the enactment of the follow-
ing revisions to Title 26, Section 4-101, the prior restriction on the voting rights of the mentally
retarded in Oklahoma is a thing of the past. Section 4-101, effective November 1, 1989, reads:
Every person who is a qualified elector as defined by Section I or Article Ill of the
Oklahoma Constitution shall be entitled to become a registered voter in the precinct of his
residence, with the following exceptions:
1. Persons convicted of a felony shall be ineligible to register for a period of time
3
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that legislative correction was a possibility.17  Absent such initiative,
however, the challenge was destined to fall to the judiciary. Such a chal-
lenge, in the context of the equal protection clause'" of the fourteenth
amendment, certainly would have succeeded. Because exclusion of the
mentally retarded from the voting process was not based on considera-
tion of the relative capabilities of the retarded individuals, but rather on
societal ignorance and misconception regarding the retarded as a class,
Section 4-101(3) inevitably would have been found unconstitutionally
inclusive.
II. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
A. Statutory Standard
The former Section 4-101 identified three categories of Oklahoma
citizens as ineligible to vote. By rejecting the mentally retarded, 9 con-
victed felons,20 and those adjudicated mentally incompetent2' as eligible
voters, Section 4-101 supplemented the age and residency requirements
enumerated in Article III, Section 122 of the Oklahoma Constitution in
equal to the time prescribed in the judgment and sentence, when such convictions have
become final.
2. Any person who has been adjudged to be an incapacitated person as such term is
defined by Section 1-111 of Title 30 of the Oklahoma Statutes, shall be ineligible to register
to vote. When such incapacitated person has been adjudged to be no longer incapacitated
such person shall be eligible to become a registered voter. The provisions of this paragraph
shall not prohibit any person adjudged to be a partially incapacitated person as such term
is defined by Section 1-111 of Title 30 of the Oklahoma Statutes from being eligible to
register to vote unless the order adjudging the person to be partially incapacitated restricts
such persons from being eligible to register to vote.
Act of May 8, 1989, ch. 174, 1989 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 438 (West) (to be codified at OKLA. STAT.
tit. 26, § 4-101).
17. The Group Homes Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-818.2(8) (Supp. 1988), provides a defini-
tion for "developmental disability" that reflects a more progressive understanding of retardation and
its effects. In addition, the Oklahoma Guardianship Act adopts the Group Homes Act definition
and provides a finding of partial incapacity and a specific evaluation regarding the capacity to vote.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 1-111(12) (Supp. 1988).
18. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "nor [shall any State] deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
19. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
20. "Persons convicted of a felony shall be ineligible to register for a period of time equal to the
time prescribed in the judgment and sentence, when such convictions have become final." OKLA.
STAT. tit. 26, § 4-101(1) (1981).
21. "Persons who have been adjudged 'mentally incompetent' as defined by Section 3 of Title
43A of the Oklahoma Statutes shall be ineligible to register until they have been declared mentally
competent by a court of competent jurisdiction." OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-101(2) (1981).
22. The Oklahoma Constitution was streamlined in 1978 to provide that "[s]ubject to such
exceptions as the Legislature may prescribe, all citizens of the United States, over the age of eighteen
(18) years, who are bona fide residents of this state, are qualified electors of this state." OKLA.
CONsT. art. III, § 1.
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 25 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss1/6
VOTING RIGHTS
defining the eligible electorate in Oklahoma. Most of these state-imposed
limitations on the franchise had been approved by the United States
Supreme Court as constitutional.23 Classification of the mentally re-
tarded has thus far escaped the scrutiny of the Court in the context of
voting rights, however.
Though each of the excluded classes was similarly situated with re-
spect to the franchise, not all enjoyed the same clarity of definition. In
the context of the mentally retarded, any apparent clarity was merely
superficial. The complexity of retardation and the diversity of its effects
prevented definitional precision through the use of generalized terms. 24
Section 4-101(3), in identifying the class subject to exclusion as "mentally
retarded persons," failed to recognize this complexity and consequently
excluded a class of individuals with a broad range of functional
capabilities."
Further compounding the definitional difficulty inherent in the con-
text of retardation was the technical difficulty in statutory integration.
Section 4-101(3) defined the term "mentally retarded persons" through a
cross-reference to title 43A, section 3 of the Oklahoma Statutes. How-
ever, an amendment to the referenced statute deleted the term "mentally
retarded person" and its successor "developmental disability" without
restructuring the definitional reference included in Section 4-101(3).26
The effect of the resulting statutory incongruity confused Oklahoma elec-
tion officials as well as the mentally retarded electorate. This confusion,
when coupled with the lack of effective enforcement provisions, fostered
23. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (exclusion of felons from the right of
suffrage implicitly authorized by the fourteenth amendment and subject to minimal scrutiny); Mar-
ston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (per curiam) (50-day voter residency requirements upheld as
constitutional); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (exclusion of military personnel from the
right of suffrage held unconstitutional where traditional state residency requirements are met). The
state's power to impose age-based restrictions on the right of suffrage is implicit in the twenty-sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The twenty-sixth amendment identifies eighteen
years of age as the threshold of constitutionality for age-based voting restrictions.
24. See S. SARASON, EDUCATIONAL HANDICAP, PUBLIC POLICY, AND SOCIAL HISTORY 11-12
(1979). See also GEARHEART & LITrON, supra note 3, at 21, 25; H. GROSSMAN, MANUAL ON
TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 5-7 (1973). The American Asso-
ciation of Mental Deficiency [AAMD] defines mental retardation as "significantly subaverage gen-
eral intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested
during the developmental period." GEARHEART & LITTON, supra note 3, at 22 (quoting H. GROSS-
MAN, supra, at 5).
25. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
26. In 1986, OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 3 was revised, eliminating the referenced definition "men-
tally retarded person" and thereby creating a statutory incongruity between Title 26, Section 4-
101(3) and Title 43A, Section 3. With the 1989 revision to Title 26, Section 4-101, which will
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an indifference to the statutory directive extended in Section 4-101(3) and
resulted in an absolute failure in its application.
Correcting this definitional oversight would have required minimal
effort by the Oklahoma Legislature. Several definitions for "mentally re-
tarded person" and "developmentally disabled person" currently exist in
scattered sections of the Oklahoma statutes. These definitions range
from the traditionally accepted definition27 to the progressive. 28  How-
ever, it was clear that a mere definitional recitation would be unlikely to
overcome the constitutional infirmities inherent in any inclusive defini-
tion of the mentally retarded.29 In addition, the legislature would have
been severely taxed to develop legitimate procedures for enforcement of
the statutory restrictions.3 °
Determining the constitutionality of a statute such as Section 4-
27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1408(A) (Supp. 1988) provides that:
"Mentally retarded person"... means a person afflicted with mental defectiveness or de-
velopmental disability from birth or from an early age to such an extent that he is incapable
of managing himself or his affairs, who for his own welfare or the welfare of others or of
the community requires supervision, control, or care, and who is not mentally ill or of
unsound mind to such an extent as to require his certification to an institution for the
mentally ill.
Id.
Compare nearly identical language used in OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 3 (Supp. 1979) at the time
the exclusionary classifications of OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-101 (Supp. 1979) were enacted:
"Mentally retarded person" means a person afflicted with mental defectiveness from birth
or from an early age to such an extent that he is incapable of managing himself and his
affairs, who, for his own welfare or the welfare of others or of the community, requires
supervision, control or care and who is not mentally ill or of unsound mind to such an
extent as to require his certification to an institution for the mentally ill as provided by this
act.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 3(g) (Supp. 1979), amended by OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 3 (1981), renum-
bered as § 1-103 (Supp. 1986).
28. "Developmental disability" is defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-818.2(8) (Supp. 1988) as:
a severely chronic disability of a person which: a. is attributable to a physical or mental
impairment or a combination of physical and mental impairments; and b. is manifested
before the person attains the age of twenty-two (22); and c. is likely to continue indefinitely;
and d. results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of
major life activity: (1) self-care, (2) receptive and expressive language, (3) learning, (4) mo-
bility, (5) self-direction, (6) capacity for independent living, (7) economic self-sufficiency; e.
reflects the person's need for a combination and sequence of special interdisciplinary or
generic care, treatment or other services which are lifelong or of extended duration and are
individually planned and coordinated.
Id.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6001(7) (1982) (very similar language used in the Developmental Disabili-
ties Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, as amended in 1978, renumbered as 42 U.S.C.A. § 6001(5)
(West Supp. 1989)).
29. See supra note 24 and infra notes 74-98 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
6
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101(3) requires an analysis of the restriction in terms of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. Three standards of judicial scrutiny have been enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court with regard to the equal protection clause.
Determining which level of scrutiny is appropriate in a given circum-
stance is in part predicated on the classification of the particular right in
dispute.
B. Equal Protection Standards and the Right to Vote
The right to vote as provided in the United States Constitution31 is
not absolute32 but rather is qualified by the power of the states to pre-
scribe qualifications for their electorate.33 The Constitution has, how-
ever, served as a source of judicially-imposed limits on the manner and
3 1. The right to vote is derived from several provisions of the United States Constitution. The
fourteenth amendment provides in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. Article I provides in part: "The House of
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second year by the People of the several
States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added). The fifteenth amendment provides that
"It]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1. The nineteenth amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIX. The twenty-fourth amendment provides in part: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote.., shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason
of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax." U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § I. The twenty-sixth
amendment states: "The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older,
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age." U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
32. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) ("This 'equal right to vote' is not
absolute; the States have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the
franchise in other ways.") (citation omitted); Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S.
621, 625 (1969) ("States have the power to impose reasonable citizenship, age, and residency require-
ments on the availability of the ballot."); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665
(1966) ("the right of suffrage 'is subject to the imposition of state standards which are not discrimi-
natory and which do not contravene any restrictions that Congress ... has imposed' ") (quoting
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89, 91 (1965) ("There can be no doubt ... [as to] the historic function of the States to establish,
on a nondiscriminatory basis, and in accordance with the Constitution .... qualifications for the
exercise of the franchise."); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959)
("The States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the
right of suffrage may be exercised absent of course the discrimination which the Constitution con-
demns.") (citations omitted); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370-71 (1886) (dictum); Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1884).
33. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973) ("administration of the electoral process is a
matter that the Constitution largely entrusts to the States"); Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336 ("the States have
the power to impose voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other ways");
Kramer, 395 U.S. at 625; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1968); South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) ("States 'have broad powers to determine the conditions under which
suffrage may be exercised'.") (citation omitted); Harper, 383 U.S. at 665; Carrington, 380 U.S. at 93-
7
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nature of any state-imposed qualifications 4  The courts have consist-
ently identified the right to vote as a fundarental political right, because
as a "citizen's link to his laws and government, [it] is protective of all
fundamental rights and privileges.",35 As a result of this characteriza-
tion, the Supreme Court, with some exceptions, 36 has established a rigor-
ous standard of judicial scrutiny37 under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment with respect to any state-imposed infringe-
ment on the right to vote.38
A strict scrutiny analysis under the equal protection clause requires
the court to evaluate two sets of criteria. First, the court must identify
the objectives advanced by the state to justify the restrictions imposed by
94; Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 50; Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1904); Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at
664.
34. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)(dictum)
("[Strict scrutiny is also used] by the courts... when state laws impinge on personal rights protected
by the Constitution."); Kusper, 414 U.S. at 55 (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 11 U.S. 624, 637 (1884));
Evans v. Cornman, 389 U.S. 419, 422 (1970) ("before that right [to vote] can be restricted, the
purpose of the restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close consti-
tutional scrutiny"); Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626; Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 ("We have long been mindful
that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifi-
cations which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.");
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554, 561, 566 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964);
Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370-
71; Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 665.
35. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970). See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886) ("[The right to vote is] a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.").
The United States Supreme Court has also identified other rights as fundamentally protected by the
United States Constitution. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(right of a uniquely private
nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (right of interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed by the
first amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
36. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (exclusion of felons from the right
of suffrage implicitly authorized by the fourteenth amendment, therefore subject to minimal
scrutiny).
37. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (dictum); Kusper, 414 U.S. at 58-59 ("For even when
pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitution-
ally protected liberty."); Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336-37; Evans, 398 U.S. at 422; Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626-
27; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968); Harper, 383 U.S. at 670; Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 540 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
The strict scrutiny standard of judicial review has also been recognized by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Fleming v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 742 P.2d 1087, 1097 (Okla. 1987)
(dictum) ("Equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when
the categorization impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, a right of a
uniquely private nature such as the right to vote."); Clegg v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 637 P.2d
103, 106 (Okla. 1981) (dictum); Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 613 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 (Okla.
1980); McClendon v. Slater, 554 P.2d 774, 777 (Okla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
"Suspect classifications" also trigger strict scrutiny, but the Supreme Court has not gone so far
as to hold the mentally retarded as a "suspect class." See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
38. Restriction on the right to vote of the mentally retarded under former Section 4-101(3) also
invoked due process implications beyond the scope of this Comment.
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the challenged statute. This identification is followed by an evaluation of
the objectives in light of the fundamental rights being restricted.
Through this analysis, the court determines the relative importance of
the objective in relation to the fundamental right infringed.3 9 To survive
this prong of a strict scrutiny analysis, the state objective must be deter-
mined by the court to be both legitimate and compelling.'
The second prong considered by the court in a strict scrutiny analy-
sis is the "fit" created between the restriction and the restricted.4 In
evaluating this prong, the court focuses on the particularity with which
the statute is tailored to effectuate the legitimate and compelling objec-
tive.42 This effect-based analysis4 3 is characterized by the evaluation of
the statute in terms of its overinclusive and underinclusive effects.' As
part of this analysis, the court considers whether alternative, less intru-
sive means are available for accomplishing the state-advanced objective
while preserving the fundamental rights of those unnecessarily affected.
The state's burden of justification in defending a challenged statute
39. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) ("heavy burden of justification is on
the State.... the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purposes"); Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 440 (dictum) (when constitutionally protected personal rights are affected, strict scrutiny is
employed to determine if statute is "suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest"); Kramer,
395 U.S. at 626-27 (statute that grants the right to vote to some residents and not to others is subject
to analysis of necessary and compelling state interest); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 271
(1967) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Each regulation must be examined in terms of its potential impact
on fundamental rights, the importance of the end sought and the necessity for the means adopted.").
40. The Supreme Court has not articulated a clear test for determining whether a state interest
is compelling, therefore the projected result of any such analysis can be considered no more than an
educated estimation. See Simpson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 677 (1977).
41. Because a strict scrutiny analysis relies upon the satisfaction of a multi-component test, the
Court often finds a violation through the mere failure to satisfy one component. See Kramer v.
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 n.14 (1969).
42. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)(dictum)
(Statutes that impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution "are subjected to strict scru-
tiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.");
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973) (" 'Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an
area so closely touching our most precious freedoms'.") (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963)); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) ("Statutes affecting constitutional rights
must be drawn with 'precision', and must be 'tailored' to serve their legitimate objectives.") (cita-
tions omitted).
43. See Kusper, 414 U.S. at 59 ("If the state has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its
legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of funda-
mental personal liberties."). See also Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337; Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627 (In applying
the strict scrutiny analysis "the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to pro-
mote a compelling state interest." (emphasis added)); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 668 (1966).
44. While the "fit" analysis comprises both an overinclusive and underinclusive component,
overinclusivity has been the primary basis for statutory rejection by the Court on equal protection,
strict scrutiny grounds. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-4 n.4 (1988).
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is substantial under a strict scrutiny analysis. The burden is best summa-
rized by the observations of some comment, ators that strict scrutiny is
often "strict" in theory, but "fatal" in fact. 5 The right to vote, as a
fundamental right, is particularly appropriate for strict scrutiny review.
As succinctly enunciated by the Supreme Court in Wesberry v. Sanders:46
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice
in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citi-
zens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the
right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for clas-
sification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right. 47
III. APPLICATION OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD
A. Statutory Objectives
In projecting the probable outcome of a judicial challenge to the
restriction imposed by Section 4-101(3), it is first necessary to determine
the probable motive underlying exclusion of the mentally retarded.
Neither a purpose statement for the statute nor legislative history is
available for establishing the true intent of the legislature. However, con-
sideration of state-advanced objectives as propounded by courts and
commentators outside Oklahoma isolate two possible objectives that the
state might have advanced in support of the exclusions contained in for-
mer Section 4-101(3).
1. Purity at the Ballot Box
The most compelling interest a state could advance in support of the
exclusion of the mentally retarded from registering and voting is prevent-
ing voter fraud. The fraud anticipated by the state might take two forms.
Each relies on the assumption that the mentally retarded are significantly
more susceptible to intentional interference by a third party with the in-
dividual's freedom of choice than is the average elector. In the first in-
stance, the alleged fraud results from the intentional manipulation of the
retarded individual in an effort to influence his vote.4" Though not unlike
the influence imposed on all voters, it may have been argued that higher
45. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-.Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. Rev. 1, 20 (1972).
46. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
47. Id. at 17-18.
48. In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1965), the Court held that the danger of undue
influence by a commander over his men was not a sufficient basis to permit disenfranchisement. See
also O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 534 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (rejecting the legitimacy
[Vol. 25:171
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than normal vulnerability of the retarded to such undue influence justi-
fied the comprehensive exclusion of the retarded as a class.49 In the sec-
ond instance, the manipulation focuses not on the individual voter, but
on the absentee ballot system. Here, the manipulator would execute the
absentee ballot for the retarded individual and in the process substitute
his own will for that of the retarded voter. The belief that the low level
of understanding inherent in the retarded enhances the possibility of
voter fraud is ill-founded.
The state might have contended that preventing voter fraud is par-
ticularly important for two overriding reasons. First, it is the states in
which the Constitution vested the power to implement and supervise the
electoral system.5 ° Accompanying this significant delegation of power is
a heightened interest in maintaining the integrity of that system. Second,
the state has a particularly poignant interest in providing for the fair and
equal representation of its electorate. Infringement through fraud would
dilute the legitimate vote, resulting in elections that might not reflect the
true will of the majority. In both cases, the state's interest in maintaining
an electoral system free of fraudulent voting practices is certainly legiti-
mate5" and would likely be found compelling. 2
A contrary position may be advanced through analysis of the proce-
dures provided for enforcing the exclusions of Section 4-101. The stat-
utes provide for effective means of identifying convicted felons53 aigd the
adjudicated mentally incompetent54 for purposes of revoking their eligi-
bility to register to vote. Procedures for notifying local county registrars
and removing identified parties from the rolls are clearly prescribed. 5
However, no similar means of identification and notification are provided
in the context of the mentally retarded. Rather, enforcement was left to
of the state's interest in preventing state officials from influencing pre-trial detainees by denying them
voting rights).
49. The viability of this assertion is necessarily dependent on the validity of the suggestion that
the retarded are significantly more susceptible to the influence of third parties than a non-excluded
individual. While it is recognized that certain individuals are more prone to ready acceptance of
outside influence than are their non-categorized counterparts, this generalization cannot conclusively
be applied to all within the exclusionary language of former Section 4-101(3).
50. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
51. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 534 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("protection of the
integrity of the ballot box is surely a legitimate state concern"); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
345 (1972) ("Surely the prevention of [voting] fraud is a legitimate and compelling governmental
goal.").
52. See, e.g., O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 534; Dunn, 405 U.S. at 345.
53. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-120.4 (1981).
54. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-120.5 (1981).
55. Id. § 4-120.4-.5.
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the individual elector56 or the local county registrar.57 Neither alterna-
tive was particularly effective in preventing the retarded from voting. 8
In addition, a clear standard of punishment is provided for any will-
ful vote cast with knowledge of ineligibility.59 This is particularly
anomolous with respect to the mentally retarded. Without clear and spe-
cific lines demarking that class of the retarded to be excluded, the scien-
ter requirement of the punishment provision is largely without effect.
Apparently, any retarded individual accused of feloniously voting while
ineligible might have relied on the failure in statutory definition to rebut
the claim that the violation was perpetrated with knowledge of the
ineligibility.
This ineffectiveness, when coupled with the complete lack of identi-
fication, notification, and enforcement provisions, renders suspect any
state interest advanced to justify exclusion of the mentally retarded from
56. At the time of registration, each voter is required to sign an oath stating:
I, the undersigned, do solemnly swear or affirm that I am a citizen of the United States
and a resident of the State of Oklahoma. I further swear that I am eighteen years of age or
older, or that I will be eighteen years of age on or before the date of the next ensuing
election.
I further swear that I have not been convicted of a felony, for which a period of time
equal to the original judgment and sentence has not expired, or for which I have not been
pardoned. I further swear that I am not now under adjudication as being mentally incom-
petent and that I am not mentally retarded.
Oklahoma State Voter Registration Oath, 1988 (emphasis added).
57. Most registrars do not have the authority to and are advised against challenging an individ-
ual regarding eligibility to register. Whether this failure to inquire is due to feelings of inadequacy to
reach such a conclusion or fear of liability in raising the issue, the fact remains that electors are
seldom challenged before registering. This is not only true with regard to the mentally retarded, but
also regarding the restrictions on residency, mental incompetency, and conviction of a felony. Tele-
phone interview with Barbara Rossetti, Assistant Secretary, Tulsa County Election Board (Feb. 15,
1989).
58. Several reasons have been advanced to explain the failure in enforcement and lack ofjudi-
cial challenge to Section 4-101(3). First, it is argued that many of the individuals encompassed by
the general exclusion are not identifiably retarded, whether visibly or through electoral records, and
therefore were not prevented from exercising the right. Second, many of the retarded who are capa-
ble, but do not vote, share the same indifference to the electoral process as a significant percentage of
the qualified electorate. See H. BONE & A. RANNEY, POLITICS AND VOTERS 6 (1971). Third, it is
argued that those remaining individuals to which the exclusions are directed are in the numerically
insignificant category of profoundly retarded to whom the right to vote is meaningless. See
GEARHEART & LIrON, supra note 3, at 26 (approximately three percent of the retarded population
fall within the severe and profound category). Fourth, it may be advanced that complacence in
enforcement, where prosecution is rare even when a violation is identified, results in a similar posture
in those responsible for initiating the enforcement of and demanding compliance with the statutory
restrictions.
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 16-102 (1981) provides that "[a]ny person who votes more than once
at any election or who, knowing that he is not eligible to vote at an election, willfully votes at said
election shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id. The felony established by Section 16-102 carries as
punishment not more than two years in the state penitentiary or a fine of not more than Five Thou-
sand Dollars, or both. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 16-101 (1981).
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the right to vote. Taken further, it may be argued that the lack of effec-
tive enforcement provisions negates any claim by the state that the inter-
est advanced is sufficiently compelling to survive strict scrutiny.
Additional support for this position may be drawn from the fact that the
statutes already provide stiff penalties for perpetrators of voter fraud.6°
Therefore, further restriction to prevent fraud in the context of the men-
tally retarded is redundant.
Another argument that might be advanced in rejecting the state in-
terest as sufficiently compelling to survive strict scrutiny is the invalidity
of the premise upon which the voter fraud restriction is based. The voter
fraud justification presupposes that the mentally retarded are signifi-
cantly more vulnerable to undue influence than the average eligible voter.
This presumption, in the context of the mentally retarded, is only par-
tially supported by fact.6' The nature of retardation encompasses vary-
ing degrees of capabilities, from the most profound to the marginally
normal. 62  As a result, any attempt to comprehensively classify the re-
tarded with respect to functional capabilities must survive the overinclu-
sive and underinclusive prongs of a strict scrutiny analysis.
60. Several existing provisions of the Oklahoma statutes provide punishment for voter fraud.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 16-105 (1981) provides: "Any person who knowingly perpetrates [election]
fraud ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 16-109 (1981) provides:
"Any person who, by means of coercion or any other method, knowingly attempts to prevent a
qualified elector from becoming registered, or a registered voter from voting, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony." Id.
61. Of every thirty retarded individuals, twenty-five will lead socially and economically in-
dependent lives. Of the remaining five individuals, four will require some assistance all their lives
but are capable of self-support. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES OF
HANDICAPPED AMERICANS: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 189 (1980) (statements of Marcia P.
Burgdorf, Co-director, Developmental Disabilities Law Project, University of Maryland at Balti-
more) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES]. See also GEARHEART & LITTON, supra note 3, at 26;
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.9 (1985) ("severe" and "profound"
retardation found in only five percent of retarded individuals).
62. Mental retardation is often divided into four classifications based on relative intelligence
and capabilities. Approximately eighty-five percent of all retarded individuals (estimated at approxi-
mately three percent of the total population) are classified as mildly retarded. With I.Q.'s in the
range of 67-52, these individuals, with proper education and training, can lead socially and economi-
cally independent lives. H. GROSSMAN, supra note 24, at 18.
A second category of retarded individuals are often described as moderately retarded. Traina-
ble and capable of leading relatively normal lives, this category is distinguished from the mildly
retarded by their greater need for supervision and support. With I.Q.'s in the range of 51-36, moder-
ately retarded individuals comprise approximately twelve percent of the retarded population. Id.
The remaining three percent of retarded individuals consists of two groups, the severely re-
tarded (I.Q. of 35-20) and profoundly retarded (I.Q. below 20). These individuals are generally
regarded as totally dependent, requiring hour by hour supervision. Id. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
442 n.9. See also GEARHEART & LITTON, supra note 3, at 26; EHLERS, KRISHEF & PROTHERO,
supra note 3, at 56.
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2. Preventing Intrusion of the Irrational Vote
Another potential "evil" prevented by the restrictions imposed by
former Section 4-101(3) was the perceived adulteration of the electoral
system by intrusion of the irrational vote.63 The state might have argued
that the mentally retarded are incapable of exercising the reason neces-
sary to cast a rational ballot; that irrationality in the electoral process
undermines the equal representation characteristic of our electoral sys-
tem by diluting the rational vote; and that preventing this dilution would
result in better government. The state may have further contended that
preservation of rationality in the electoral process and the pursuit of bet-
ter government are each compelling state interests.
The counterarguments to this position are identical to those ad-
vanced in rejecting prevention of voter fraud as a compelling state inter-
est. First, failure to provide an effective means of enforcement indicates
legislative indifference rather than compelling state interest. 6' Second,
the premise that all mentally retarded persons are incapable of casting a
rational ballot is factually inaccurate, therefore negating the argument in
favor of comprehensive exclusion.
Moreover, studies indicate that the voting patterns of the mentally
ill 66 do not differ significantly from those of the general population. 67
Either rationality is not a significant criterion in establishing the capacity
to vote or mental illness (and by analogy retardation) does not signifi-
cantly affect the casting of a rational ballot. In either case, little judicial
guidance is available to project how a court might react to an argument
advancing rational voting as a legitimate and compelling state interest. 68
However, in the analogous context of intelligent and informed voting, the
63. In the context of this Comment, "rational voter" means any potential elector who is capa-
ble of a minimal understanding of the nature and purpose of the electoral process and is capable of
participating in that process based on that understanding. Note the distinction between capacity to
understand and actual understanding. The inability to vote rationally differs significantly from the
ability to vote rationally but failing to do so.
64. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 61; infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
66. Though the mentally ill and mentally retarded suffer from deficits which are very different
in cause, parallels may be drawn between the two with respect to the perceived rationality.
67. Klein & Grossman, Voting Patterns ofMental Patients in a Community State Hospital, 3
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 149 (1967).
68. With respect to the quality of the voter's decisionmaking process, the only area addressed
by the Supreme Court has been in the context of literacy tests. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). At that time the Court applied a minimal scrutiny standard, leav-
ing open the question of whether such restrictions would meet the strict scrutiny standard imposed
today. Id. at 51. See L. TRIBE, supra note 44, at §§ 13-15.
[Vol. 25:171
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United States Supreme Court has found a state's interest legitimate with-
out determining whether it is also compelling.6 9
B. Do the Means Justify the Ends?
Assuming arguendo that the interests in excluding the mentally re-
tarded from the right of suffrage are both legitimate and compelling, a
court must evaluate the effect of the statute on the fundamental rights
involved. Section 4-101(3) comprehensively denies the right of suffrage
to all persons classified as mentally retarded.7° The net effect is exclusion
of a class containing many mentally retarded individuals who are fully
capable of voting.7 Additionally, the classification does not prevent
from voting many individuals who are either irrational or equally suscep-
tible to third party influence.72 It is these overinclusive and underinclu-
sive classifications that strict scrutiny forbids.73
1. Overinclusive Classification
The general presumption apparently underlying the former exclu-
sion of the mentally retarded from the right to vote is that the retarded
lack the requisite capacity to exercise the right rationally or are inher-
ently susceptible to abuse of the system through fraud.74 This assessment
has been widely rejected in both the medical and mental health commu-
nities,75 as well as by an ever-increasing number of courts76 and legisla-
tures.77 The Oklahoma Legislature, in the 1988 provisions of the
69. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973) (dictum);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-55 (1966).
70. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text; infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
74. See B. SALES, supra note 14, at 99. See also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA ADVISORY COMMITTEE, THE LAST SUFFRAGE FRONTIER: ENFRANCHIS-
ING MENTAL HOSPITAL RESIDENTS 21-22 (1978).
75. See B. SALES, supra note 14, at 99. See generally supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text;
infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985) (dictum);
Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hospital, 259 Cal. App. 2d 562, 572-73, 66 Cal. Rptr. 659, 665 (1968).
77. In the recently enacted Oklahoma Guardianship Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, §§ 1-101 to 5-
101 (Supp. 1988), the Oklahoma Legislature recognizes that the lack of capacity for one purpose
does not create a presumption of incapacity for all purposes. Section 3-113 of the Act expressly
provides for a finding of partial incapacity upon evaluation of the individual in several specific areas.
The capacity to vote is one specified area. Though the Act is limited in its application to guardian-
ship hearings, it may be argued that in identifying the retarded as one of the class subject to such
findings, the legislature recognizes the varying capabilities inherent in the retarded as a class. See id.§§ 1-111(12)(a)(2), 1-111(21).
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Oklahoma Guardianship Act,78 exhibits a legislative awareness of the va-
rying capabilities of the mentally retarded. Yet society harbors the ill-
founded notion that the retarded as a class are devoid of reason and gen-
erally incapable of thoughtful consideration. Therefore, any analysis of
individual rights with respect to the retarded requires at least a cursory
understanding of the capacital distinctions within the class.
a. Mental Retardation: A Factual Perspective
Much of the stigma surrounding the mentally retarded may be ex-
plained by the extreme and conspicuous nature of the disability in some
individuals. Studies indicate that the predominant societal perception of
the retarded is that of the most severe cases.79 Though mental health
and education professionals recognize retardation as encompassing a
broad range of functional capabilities, much of society is unaware of this
distinction. 0
An effect-based analysis under the second prong of strict scrutiny,
however, requires a conscientious understanding of the complexity of re-
tardation and the diversity of its effects. A thorough investigation of
characteristics inherent in the varying degrees of mental retardation is
required and consideration of the statutory "fit" must reflect an under-
standing of those characteristics. For purposes of research and interdis-
ciplinary communication, the heterogeneous population of the retarded
have been divided into homogenous subgroups. This classification
scheme includes the generally accepted categories of mild, moderate, se-
vere, and profound retardation. Each subgroup is characterized by vary-
ing degrees of functional capabilities.
The most functionally limited subgroups consist of the severe and
profoundly retarded. Characterized by limited language, speech, and
motor capabilities, severe and profound retardation is often accompanied
by physical handicaps. 8 These individuals experience impaired judg-
ment, are unable to make important life decisions, and require permanent
hour by hour supervision and care.82 Combined, these subgroups com-
prise approximately three percent of the total retarded population. 3
78. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, §§ 1-101 to 5-101 (Supp. 1988).
79. BEGAB & RICHARDSON, supra note 6, at 103.
80. BEGAB & RICHARDSON, supra note 6, at 103. See also R. INGALLS, MENTAL RETARDA-
TION: THE CHANGING OUTLOOK 2-6 (1978).
81. EHLERS, KRISHEF & PROTHERO, supra note 3, at 56.
82. EHLERS, KRISHEF & PROTHERO, supra note 3, at 56. See also CIVIL RIGHTS IssUES, supra
note 61, at 189.
83. GEARHEART & LITTON, supra note 3, at 26-27. See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
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The remaining ninety-seven percent of the retarded population is
divided into two groups distinguished by varying degrees of capability.
Comprising an estimated twelve percent of the total retarded popula-
tion,84 the moderately retarded are characterized as trainable,85 capable
of self-care, and able to perform useful tasks at home and simple jobs in
sheltered workshops.86 Members of this subgroup require support and
some supervision all their lives, but are capable, in some instances, of
self-support.17
By far the most predominant category of retardation, the mildly re-
tarded, comprise approximately eighty-five percent of the retarded popu-
lation."8 Characterized as educable, these individuals are slow to
develop, but ordinarily achieve a state of social and economic indepen-
dence.89 Generally capable of managing their affairs with minimal coun-
seling and guidance, members of this group lead relatively normal lives.9"
The varying capabilities inherent in these subgroups fairly illustrate
the inequity in comprehensively classifying the mentally retarded for
purposes of exclusion from the right to vote. Where individuals have the
capacity to manage their own affairs and live socially and economically
independent lives, the state would be hard pressed to contend that they
lack the capacity to vote. Therefore, it may be reasonably concluded that
exclusion of the mentally retarded from the voting process is not based
on consideration of the relative capabilities of the retarded individual,
but rather on societal ignorance and misconception regarding the re-
tarded as a class. For this reason a court might readily find that a statute
restricting all mentally retarded from voting is unconstitutionally
overinclusive.
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.9 (1985); CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES, supra note 61, at 189. The
mentally retarded population as a whole comprises approximately three percent of the total popula-
tion of the United States. GEARHEART & LITTON, supra note 3, at 26-27.
84. GEARHEART & LITTON, supra note 3, at 26-27.
85. EHLERS, KRISHEF & PROTHERO, supra note 3, at 56.
86. EHLERS, KRISHEF & PROTHERO, supra note 3, at 56. See also GEARHEART & LITTON,
supra note 3, at 120-31; CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES, supra note 61, at 189.
87. EHLERS, KRISHEF & PROTHERO, supra note 3, at 56; CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES, supra note 61,
at 189.
88. GEARHEART & LITrON, supra note 3, at 26-27. See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.9 (1985); CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES, supra note 61, at 189.
89. EHLERS, KRISHEF & PROTHERO, supra note 3, at 56; CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES, supra note 61,
at 189.
90. CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES, supra note 61, at 189.
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b. Legislative Recognition
In 1988, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted the Oklahoma Guardi-
anship Act.9' Though designed to regulate the guardianship system, sev-
eral provisions reflect a more factually accurate legislative understanding
of the mentally retarded. 92 Moreover, the provisions of the Act are par-
ticularly pertinent to the voting rights of the mentally retarded both now
and in the future.
The significance of the Act in the context of the voting rights of the
mentally disabled in Oklahoma is twofold. First, the Act relies on the
near-clinical definition of mental retardation contained in Title 63, Sec-
tion 1-818.2(8). 93 This is significant because it reflects a legislative
awareness of mental retardation as a complex and diverse condition. 94 It
is this diversity that prevents comprehensive exclusion of the retarded
from the voting process in a manner acceptable under the equal protec-
tion clause. In addition, by recognizing the diverse capabilities of the
retarded, the legislature indirectly undercuts the arguments advanced in
support of the compelling state interest and clearly supports the conten-
tion that the provisions of former Section 4-101(3) were unconstitution-
ally overinclusive.
Second, the Act provides for a judicial finding of partial incapac-
ity.95 One criterion specifically enumerated for consideration in this con-
text is the capacity of the individual to vote. 96 Due to the broad range of
91. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, §§ 1-101 to 5-101 (Supp. 1988).
92. Particularly relevant to evaluating the mentally retarded is the Oklahoma Guardianship
Act. Section 3-108 provides for the evaluation of the subject of the hearing by health care profes-
sionals in an effort to aid the judge in determining the individual's capacity. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30,
§ 3-108 (Supp. 1988). Section 3-113 requires specific consideration and determination of the individ-
ual's capacity to vote. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 3-113 (Supp. 1988).
93. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-818.2(8) (Supp. 1988). See also supra note 28.
94. See supra notes 24 and 61-62 and accompanying text.
95. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 1-111(21) defines the term "partially incapacitated person" as:
[A]n incapacitated person whose impairment is only to the extent that without the assist-
ance of a limited guardian said person is unable to:
a. meet the essential requirements for his physical health or safety, or
b. manage all of his financial resources or to engage in all of the activities necessary for
the effective management of his financial resources.
A finding that an individual is a partially incapacitated person shall not constitute a
finding of legal incompetence. A partially incapacitated person shall be legally competent
in all areas other than the area or areas specified by the court in its dispositional or subse-
quent orders. Such person shall retain all legal rights and abilities other than those expressly
limited or curtailed in said orders.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 1-111(21) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
When read in conjunction with Sections 3-108 and 3-113, the distinctive capabilities of the
varying degrees of mental retardation are statutorily subject to consideration in the context of
guardianship.
96. A similar analysis might also have been appropriate with respect to former OKLA. STAT. tit.
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functional capabilities inherent in the class,9 7 this provision is particu-
larly appropriate for application to the mentally retarded. The flexibility
provided in the Act also reflects a legislative cognizance of the potential
conflict between the varying degrees of mental retardation and the right
to vote. Additionally, it expresses a factually based conclusion that not
all mentally retarded individuals are incapable of exercising the reason
necessary to cast a rational ballot nor are they unacceptably susceptible
to the influence of others.
Moreover, it may be argued from the perspective of scientific estima-
tion that approximately eighty-five percent of Oklahoma's mentally re-
tarded population are functionally capable of exercising the right to
vote.98 Based upon this empirical consideration of the capabilities of
the retarded as a generic class and given an apparently similar considera-
tion by the Oklahoma Legislature, it is clear that a court would hold the
provisions of a statute such as Section 4-101(3) unconstitutionally
overinclusive.
2. Underinclusive Classification
Though not as apparent, it may be reasonably asserted that the pro-
visions of Section 4-101(3) were also underinclusive in the context of the
state interests advanced. By limiting the exclusions to the mentally re-
tarded, the statute failed to prevent the potentiality of fraud that may
exist in any institutional setting.99 Nursing homes and long term hospi-
tal care facilities provide fertile ground for these same fraudulent prac-
tices. Additionally, the statute failed to limit the potentially irrational
vote resulting from senility in the aged or the severely mentally ill.
Though seldom a basis for judicial rejection of a statute affecting funda-
mental rights, the Supreme Court has articulated underinclusivity as a
26, § 4-101(2), regarding the adjudicated mentally incompetent. For statutory text of Section 4-
10 1(2), see supra note 21.
97. See supra note 62.
98. See supra notes 61-62 and 88-90 and accompanying text. Census for the state of Oklahoma
in 1988 reveals a total population of 3,025,487. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS
(1988). Of this group, an estimated three percent suffer from some degree of retardation. See
GEARHEART & LITTON, supra note 3, at 26. Therefore, approximately 90,765 Oklahoma citizens
suffer some form of retardation. Of this group, approximately three percent, or 2,723 persons, are
severely and profoundly retarded; twelve percent, or 10,892 persons, are moderately retarded; and
eighty-five percent, or 77,150 persons, are mildly retarded.
99. The nature of the institutional setting may be conducive to fraudulent voting practices be-
cause the manipulation can be imposed, whether on the individual or on the absentee ballot, on a
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potential ground for invalidation."°°
C. Alternative Means of Achieving the Objective
Again, assuming arguendo that the state-advanced objective is both
legitimate and compelling, the final step in a strict scrutiny analysis of
former Section 4-101(3) requires consideration of alternative means of
achieving the state objective. 101 The goal in developing these alternatives
is to accomplish the state objective in a manner least intrusive into the
fundamental rights of affected individuals. Upon identifying the best of
the alternative methods, the court weighs the existing method of achiev-
ing the state objective and the "fit" created thereby against the alterna-
tive method and the "fit" that can most reasonably be anticipated to
result from its implementation.10 2 The approach that least intrusively
promotes the state objective determines the constitutional fate of the
challenged statute.
A least intrusive yet workable alternative for accomplishing the
state objectives advanced in support of former Section 4-101(3) 103 might
have been extracted from existing provisions of the Oklahoma statutes. 0 4
Though intended to address areas other than the right to vote of the
mentally retarded, many of the resources necessary to achieve a constitu-
tionally acceptable "fit" are available in these provisions. Moreover, im-
plementation of the procedures necessary to achieve this "fit" would be
substantially simplified through the use of modified versions of existing
statutory provisions.
Because of the inherently complex definition of the varying capabili-
ties of the retarded, 105 a "least intrusive means" approach requires evalu-
ation of the retarded on an individual basis. To prevent fraud and
irrationality in the voting process, the method devised must identify
those retarded individuals who are most vulnerable to improper influence
and who lack the reason necessary to vote rationally. Such an individual
evaluation procedure would not vary significantly from that currently
provided in scattered sections of the Oklahoma statutes.
100. See Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644, 1650 n.38 (1979).
Although no voting restrictions have been invalidated for underinclusivity, restrictions on other
rights have. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972).
101. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
102. See supra text accompanying note 44.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 48-69.
104. See e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, §§ 3-101, 3-108, 3-113 (Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26,
§§ 4-120.4-.5, 14-115 (1981).
105. See supra note 62.
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The first step in the implementation of the offered alternative is the
elimination of the statutory restriction on the franchise contained in Sec-
tion 4-101(3). t°6 Having eliminated the exclusions imposed by the stat-
ute, a mentally retarded individual would be free to register to vote just
as any other elector. While registering, the individual would be infor-
mally scrutinized by the registrar for any signs that would indicate inca-
pacity to vote. Upon identifying a party as potentially incapable, the
registrar would file a challenge with the county election board. Any re-
gistration challenged by the registrar would then be certified to the court
for review. 17 The court would interview the retarded individual as nec-
essary to determine whether the capacity to vote existed.108 In some in-
stances the court might order an evaluation of the individual by an
assortment of health care professionals to aid in the decision making pro-
cess. 9 Upon reaching a determination regarding the capacity of the in-
dividual to vote, the court would order the clerk to notify the county
106. Effective November 1, 1989, Section 4-101(3) was repealed. The text of the revised statute
states:
Any person who has been adjudged to be an incapacitated person as such term is defined
by Section 1-111 of Title 30 of the Oklahoma Statutes, shall be ineligible to register to vote.
When such incapacitated person has been adjudged to be no longer incapacitated such
person shall be eligible to become a registered voter. The provisions of this paragraph shall
not prohibit any person adjudged to be a partially incapacitated person as such term is
defined by Section 1-111 of Title 30 of the Oklahoma Statutes from being eligible to register
to vote unless the order adjudging the person to be partially incapacitated restricts such
persons from being eligible to register to vote.
Act of May 8, 1989, ch. 174, 1989 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 438 (West) (to be codified at OKLA. STAT.
tit. 26, § 4-101).
107. This procedure would not differ significantly from the procedures currently in effect in
OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 3-101 (Supp. 1988). There the court receives petitions from any individual
interested in the welfare of a person believed to be incapacitated or partially incapacitated. Id.
The rights of the individual would also be adequately protected as provided in OKLA. STAT. tit.
30, § 3-106 (Supp. 1988). Section 3-106 provides for notice, presence at the hearing, power to com-
pel the attendance of witnesses, presentation of evidence, appeal, representation by court-appointed
counsel, and privacy of the proceedings. Id.
108. The procedure would necessarily require an evaluation by the court regarding the capacity
of the individual. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 3-113 (Supp. 1988) provides that the judge, in the disposi-
tional order, upon finding that the party is partially incapacitated, shall set forth the specific limita-
tions to be imposed upon the party. One area specifically identified as requiring the judge's
evaluation and determination is the capacity to vote. Id.
109. The evaluation procedure of OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 3-113 is supplemented by Section 3-108
which provides for evaluation of the subject of the proceedings by a physician, psychologist, qualified
social worker, or "'other expert with knowledge of the particular incapacity or disability." Id. § 3-
108B. Section 3-108 further requires an evaluation report be filed with the court by the examiner
outlining the nature and extent of the incapacity, a description of the mental, emotional, and physi-
cal condition of the person, an opinion regarding the kind and extent of assistance required and an
assessment of the services necessary to provide for the well-being of the person. Id. § 3-108C. Addi-
tionally the report must include an opinion regarding the probability that the incapacity will lessen
or worsen. Id. § 3-108C(5).
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election board of its findings." The election board secretary would
either enroll the individual as a registered voter, sending notice to that
effect, or notify the individual of the revocation of his challenged regis-
tration."1 In this way the state could rely on state officials to monitor
and enforce the exclusion of those retarded individuals adjudicated as
lacking the capacity to vote.
While such a proposal would require the education of registrars in
identifying those not capable of voting, such education would not be pro-
hibitively difficult. If consistently accurate or overwhelmingly frequent
identification were envisioned, the task might be insurmountable. How-
ever, the relative incidence of identification would likely be infrequent" t2
and in terms of accuracy, a keypoint checklist and a guarded skepticism
would likely suffice.
Another potential difficulty in the proposed approach is the educa-
tion of judges in determining what the capacity to vote requires. Though
a difficult task, the Oklahoma Legislature has apparently already devel-
oped the necessary procedures, as evidenced by the provisions of Title 30,
Section 3-113. 1 This section requires an evaluation similar to that pro-
posed and a dispositional order that includes a specific finding as to the
ward's capacity to vote.' 14 In addition the statute provides a judge the
opportunity to consult with medical and psychological professionals in
reaching a determination, diminishing the potential for an uninformed
adjudication. " 5
Existing statutes also serve to address the potential fraud resulting
from abuse of the absentee ballot system."i 6 Registration of those indi-
viduals wishing to vote yet unable to travel to the registration office
would be accomplished by the assignment of registration boards.' ' 7
110. Existing statutes require a court clerk to notify the county election board of adjudications of
mental incompetence and convictions for felony in order that those individuals so adjudicated may
be removed from the roll of registered voters. See also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
I 11. Currently the election board secretary does not send notice to the adjudicated mentally
incompetent or to convicted felons regarding registration revocation. Telephone interview with Bar-
bara Rossetti, Assistant Secretary, Tulsa County Election Board (Feb. 15, 1989).
112. See supra note 58.
113. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 3-113 (Supp. 1988).
114. See supra note 108.
115. See supra note 109.
116. See supra note 60.
117. No general statutory provisions exist for registration where the party is confined and unable
to travel to designated registration points. However, informal registration procedures do currently
exist specifically for those confined to institutions or residential care facilities. These include com-
munication between the local county election board and the activities director of the facility regard-
ing parties in the facilities who wish to become registered. The county election board then sends a
[Vol. 25:171
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These boards would consist of two qualified registrars, one for each party
affiliation, and would be assigned the task of delivering and procuring the
voluntary registration of the homebound individuals. The capacity of an
elector would be subject to challenge in much the same manner as pro-
posed above. Distribution and collection of absentee ballots in this cir-
cumstance would follow similar procedures provided in title 26, section
14-115118 with respect to parties confined to nursing homes or convales-
cent hospitals.
Because many of the suggested procedures are currently a part of
the Oklahoma statutes, little legislative effort would be required to effec-
tuate their application to the mentally retarded. In addition, the class of
individuals formerly excluded by Section 4-101(3) would be narrowed
substantially, resulting in exclusion based on the professional and in-
formed evaluation of the retarded individual, rather than the categorical
exclusion of an ill-defined class. This specially tailored statutory scheme
is precisely the approach mandated by a strict scrutiny analysis under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Though it may not be necessary to provide any form of restriction
on the right to vote of the mentally disabled in Oklahoma, the foregoing
alternatives suggest procedures specifically structured to deal with the
diverse nature of retardation should the legislature find such restrictions
necessary. These alternatives, coupled with the inevitable finding that a
statute excluding all mentally retarded persons is overinclusive and the
supplemental arguments advanced in derogation of the compelling state
interest, make it abundantly clear that the statute would have failed a
strict scrutiny analysis. Fortunately, however, the continued absence of
judicial challenge has not delayed legislative reconsideration of the issue.
Yet the inequity formally cultivated by Section 4-101(3) serves to
registrar to the facility to register the individuals. Telephone interview with Barbara Rossetti, Assis-
tant Secretary, Tulsa County Election Board (Feb. 15, 1989).
118. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 14-115 (1981) serves to permit the free exercise of the franchise by
those individuals confined to nursing homes and convalescent hospitals. However, the structure of
the statute and the safeguards enacted therein are apparently tailored to prevent fraudulent voting
practices in the distribution and collection of absentee ballots in the institutional context. See supra
note 99 and accompanying text. Section 14-115 requires that absentee ballots be delivered and col-
lected by absentee voting boards. Id. The boards consist of two members each, one from each party
affiliation. Id. Further safeguards include the requirement that the voter mark his ballot, place it in
the envelope, and seal the inner and outer envelopes. Id.
1989]
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illustrate the danger associated with ambiguity in legislative action, espe-
cially where the ambiguity results from a lack of essential knowledge re-
garding the particular issue. Repeal of the constitutionally offensive
provisions of this section of the Oklahoma statutes signifies a commit-
ment to the evolution of Oklahoma in the area of mental health and
moves one step closer to overcoming societal ignorance and misconcep-
tion regarding the mentally retarded.
Steven K. Metcalf
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